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[voices recorded before the lecture starts: HOST and COOPER discussing the setup of the
microphone, and which college COOPER is from]
HOST: Good afternoon. For those that may have not been here this morning, I still need to
indicate that the Portland chapter of Sigma Xi is sponsoring a series of lectures on the general
topic “Earth Resources Limited,” and our speaker this morning was Bill Cooper, and this
afternoon it’s also Bill Cooper from Michigan State University—an outstanding ecologist
involved with a lot of national affairs in all sorts of ways, but as a scientist, primarily. And this
afternoon’s lecture is on “Toxic Chemicals in the Environment.” Bill Cooper.
BILL COOPER: We touched between 11 and 12 this morning in our discussion, briefly, on some
of the aspects, but I want to kinda back off and systematically approach the topic of that
problem of, that proportion of, that aspect of an ecosystem management dealing with what
economists call “residual management”; what, often times, environmentalists call “pollution.”
It’s the discharge of thermal and chemical, you know, residual materials, left over from either
the direct production of goods, or once commodity goes in the marketplace and you utilize it as
a consumer, what happens to it after it leaves your use. Now, the reason I chose the topic of
toxic materials is if I had to name one area that I personally think that in the next 10 to 15 to 20
years is gonna constitute the most difficult, and yet important, area of environmental issues
that we have not yet learned to come to grips with, it’s the area of toxic materials. I can lay this

out for you either in terms of a theoretical kind of presentation, in terms of the
thermodynamics, and the kinetics, and so forth; the transport and fates and effects of toxic
chemicals, or I could illustrate it for you by walking you through a couple of case studies, and
I’ve chosen to do the latter. I think often times it’s more informative if you can wrap your
message that you want as an ecologist up in some kind of physical case that people have read
about—they’ve seen, they’ve experienced—so they can identify with it. You can still get the
same points across and do it in a very real, and ostensibly, accurate sense.
The few case studies I’ll show you… [recording is muffled for approximately 15 seconds, picking
up only the a few words and the sound of the speaker’s voice until 03:00] …made a movie called
The Poisoning of Michigan that was shown all over the Midwest and the East Coast. We had
quite a total traumatizing effect on the state of Michigan, and it was a fairly accurate movie.
That’s the one case study. It happens to be a fire retardant that accidentally got directly
injected into animal feed in the dairy industry in Michigan, and prior to our catching it, it
diffused its way through the state. And that happened in 1973, and right now it’s sitting in the
Supreme Court in Michigan and it’s just as hot, politically, as it ever was; in fact, it’s even hotter
now than it was five years ago. It’s an environmental episode that’s long from over, and it’s
gone from the realm of hard science into the realm of the social hysteria, and I’ll illustrate some
points, I think, from that point of view.
The second case study I wanted to choose was one which has a very different set of properties
to it. It’s the Kepone incident in Virginia. If you remember, again, it’s one that you might have
seen on 60 Minutes, read about, it’s the insecticide that was dumped intentionally into the
James River. We have 100,000 pounds of it sitting there now. It’s one that Life Sciences… a lot
of people got hurt when it first happened. A number of workers got sterilized, a permanent
injury in terms of human health effects. It’s one that, locally, the people in Virginia believe has
gone away because they haven’t read about it. It’s one of these cases where, you know, when
it’s first in front of ya, everybody’s concerned, and as soon as the exposure, in terms of publc
media, goes away, people somehow assume that… [recording is muffled and speaker’s voice is
barely audible for about 10 seconds, until 04:37]… so there seems to be an inverse relationship
between the attention of the individuals and the actual nature of the project. I didn’t—I
wanna—I picked these two state case studies by [sighing] really as illustrative examples.
Virginia and Michigan are not dumb states; we don’t have necessarily irresponsible industry.
These happen to be just two situations where the accidents, or in this case, in one case an
accident, in the other case intentional dumping—was of such a magnitude that you couldn’t
afford to ignore what happened; that’s the only thing unique about it. The only thing unique
about it is that people were forced to look at it and try to understand what happened.

This kind of thing goes on everyday in smaller scales. Oregon is no different than the other
states. I’ll guarantee you if you went out and forcibly went through and looked at all your
industrial waste haulers, the total chemical mass balance… if you went and looked at the
number of toxic materials sold in the watershed, okay, in the municipality of Portland, and
tracked those things chemically as to what happens, they went to the market and where they
eventually ended up, you would find these case studies in hundreds of them. Simultaneously. I
can walk you through some of the other ones we have going in Michigan. We have been stung
pretty bad so now we’re diligently looking and we’re finding this stuff all over the place.
Virginia’s doing the same doggone thing. And so, I’ve picked case studies that I think are typical;
they’re blips in a learning curve. One of the questions that you can ask yourself is whether or
not we’ve learned anything from it, or does each state have to go through one of these
experiences before they actually face up to the issue in front of ‘em? If so, it’s gonna be a very
costly and traumatic learning experience, I’ll guarantee you. That’s gonna be a very, very
inefficient and costly way for education, if you gotta personally walk through one of these
yourselves.
Now, if we back off for a minute, what I’d like to do, we’ll look at the toxic materials problem in
a more generic sense. I’ll just kinda set out an academic foundation for this thing. Basically, it
really comes down to the fact that we, about 19… in the 1940’s, the war years. To a great
degree, we had the invention of synthetic chemistry to a great… you know, the major industrial
use of synthetic chemistry. We had many of our kinds of inputs in terms of both organic
products and inorganic products like natural rubber, and like tin and so forth. The imports were
blocked from us in World War II, and so when we couldn't guarantee flows of iron and flows of
natural rubber, we made synthetic rubber and we went to plastics. We went to various
different kinds of alternative substitutes to resources you’d find in the natural world and that
you’d find in the world. So we substituted man-made synthetic compounds for things that were
naturally developed or naturally, you know, deposited in terms of your own accessibility, in
terms of natural compounds. Now, we really had a choice there. You could say, “Well, fine, if
we gotta make synthetic fibers…” you know, seat covers, clothes, you name it. If you look
around this room, probably 80% of the compounds in this room are man-made compounds,
they aren’t natural organics at all, they aren’t wood fibers, they aren’t cotton fibers; they’re
things that are essentially made as polymers of carbon-type compounds. Myself included, but
most of us either haven’t had organic chemistry or rapidly forgot it ‘cause it was taught to us in
a very uninspiring fashion, in my particular case; what we’re really doing is we’re going back
and learning our organic chemistry in a very, very painful way, ‘cause when we talk about
organic chemistry, meaning: organic complexes, synthetic molecules, polymers made taking
carbon as the basic store for the building blocks… [recording is muffled for a few seconds until
07:51] …you put these together in different configurations, okay? And you’re really only limited

by the amount your imagination and how many different ways you can hook things up, which
gives you tremendous diversity of which you can go on and make different alternative chemical
structures, each one with different biochemical properties. You put these together in different
ways and they act differently; they have different toxicologies, they move through the
environment at different rates of speed, they break down more or less rapidly, they might or
might not accumulate in biological food chains and cause other kinds of public health effects.
So there’s tremendous, you know, different implications of hooking organic compounds up in
various ways.
The reason that we went to carbon as the basic structure to build on is, first of all, we can make
polymers—we can hook ‘em in long chains—and, also, carbon was cheap. Carbon was cheap
‘cause most of these carbon compounds came as secondary by-products from the petroleum
industry. When you refine gasoline and all the petroleum products left over, a lot of ‘em went
into plastics, they went in synthetic fibers, they went into antibiotics, they went into food
additives, and into a tremendous diversity of synthetic organic compounds. So carbon was
amenable to these kinds of multi-structured systems, and it also was a very cheap compound.
On the other hand, if you think about it, the mere fact that we took the same basic building
block carbon that you’re made out of… [recording device is muffled and picks up a phrase from
another recording (minute 9 of Michael Arbib,“Participation and alienation in large
democracies”) before returning to COOPER] Stop and think of what would happen if we
decided, well, we shouldn't use carbon, we’ll use silicone. We’ll make silicone compounds—
polymers of silicone which is a very common element; which is much, much less biologically
active. Whether we would still have the same class of environmental toxicology problems that
we do with chlorinated hydrocarbons and the things we’ll talk about today. The point is we
didn’t do it, we pretty much built the whole synthetic chemical industry on a carbon-based
molecule which, essentially, is the same basic structure that you use biochemically.
Now, to go the next step and look at the structure of organic compounds, basically up to about
mid-1940’s, the organic chemist was pretty much… [drawing]—I’m not much of an artist here—
pretty much dependent on hooking things up in two-dimensional ways; you could make various
kinds of organic compounds, okay, by essentially laying your tinker toys out on a twodimensional tabletop, and it very much constrained their options. In the mid-1940s, some
chemists developed something they called “cubane.” For the first time, there was a major
breakthrough in organic chemistry. They made a cube-shaped compound [drawing] like that,
and it was really unique; there’s no compound like that in nature. Far as I know, there’s no
cubic organic compound, these are totally man-made, okay? And now, stop and think of the
configurations—the number of permutations and combinations—of products a chemist could
make when he could hook things up in three dimensions. You know, just conceptually, you can

go almost any way you want, now, can’t you? If I take that same thing called cubane—that
same compound called cubane—and modify it just slightly, where I… [drawing] let me get this
thing right… and I put something like that, and I put and O2 on it—oxygen—and I put somethin’
like that, and I put two chlorines, that’s Kepone! If I put a chlorine in each one of these
intersections, okay, I have this little organic compound we’re gonna talk about.
That particular compound, Kepone, which was the insecticide that was dumped into the James
River, is one of the most toxic compounds I personally have ever worked with. It will kill fish in
parts per trillion, a spot in the James River’s bioassay. It’ll cause cancer; in bladder… liver cancer
in mice in parts per billion, okay? It’s a compound that was made to be very stable. This thing
was made in fuming sulfuric acid and it was washed in a very strong hydroxide so during the
production and purification procedure, it was exposed to a very strong reduction—very strong
oxidation—which means it’s very resistant to any chemical breakdown, all right? It’s a cubeshaped compound with 10 chlorines on it. Chlorines are one of the halogens. Halogens are
chlorine, bromine, fluorine, and iodine. Chlorine com… halogens like this have single electrons
acceptance. They have a very strong affinity for electrons, and if you know anything about your
biochemistry, that’s the way your electron transport system operates biochemically; it’s passing
electrons around your body. And so the halogens is a class of elements—very biologically
reactive yet oftentimes in a negative sense, in terms of public health and terms of effects, and
so this essentially represents a class of compounds, not just Kepone itself. We can talk about
Kepone as a chlorinated hydrocarbon. When I talk about PBB, it’s a brominated hydrocarbon.
Rather than having chlorine hooks outta this thing, it’s got bromine hooked onto it. Remember
the aerosols? Your ozone controversy? That was a fluorinated… fluorocarbons 11 and 12 are
refrigerants that they’re using. Again, it’s a fluorine attached to the hydrocarbon molecule. I
have not yet, myself, run into a major environmental problem with iodine compounds. I’m sure
they’re there, the logic says they have to be… I had not… I just don’t know of one myself that
essentially has yet made a major catastrophe or major social issue.
But we’re talking about, then, a whole class of compounds where essentially you take off a
hydrogen and stick on a halogen. These things are very toxic from that point of view, and are
very stable. To actually break this compound down thermally, you have to burn it at about 2700
degrees for 8 seconds duration. We did this at Monsanto. It broke down about 85% of it, the
other 15% went out the smoke stack. So here we built a compound that is known toxic; it’s…
this was used in ant traps; this is the insecticide. You know those little ant traps you buy, you
put around your house? This was the powder that’s in that thing, okay? It’s built as an
insecticide; it’s built to be chemically very, very stable. It's very toxic and essentially persists in
the environment for long period of time; it’s got a, what we call a “half life” that is almost
infinite. If you put that stuff out—look at it—you put a pound out there, 10,000 years from now

that same pound’s gonna be sittin’ there, okay? The pure fact that the way we made that
compound, we made it almost indestructible, at least for anything that you’d find out there in
the natural environment.
Now, Kepone is an extreme case. The properties of Kepone make it extremely bad actor. It’s
one that you probably could’ve looked at during the manufacturing process and then say, “No
damn way we’re going to build that thing.” But when they didn't, nobody was concerned about
that, all right? But that’s… I picked the one extreme. PBB is nowhere near as toxic and nowhere
near as stable as Kepone. Here’s my other example I’m gonna give you. Now, if you actually
look at the statistics of this kind of thing, then the numbers change all the time and there can
be a rough idea about the nature of the problem you're dealing with. EPA estimates there’s
about 2 million different species of synthetic compounds right now in your marketplace. If you
went out there and went up and down the shop—supermarket—or went up and down the
clothing store or hardware store, and started writing down every different species of organic
compound that’s currently licensed and marketed in this country, there’s something over 2
million of ‘em. The National Cancer Institute, at least the last testament I saw, estimated
probably 72,000 of ‘em are potentially carcinogenic. We know the detailed information on
probably a dozen. If you ask me, “How many of these compounds can we actually go out and
predict where they’re gonna go in the environment? How long are they gonna last? Where are
they gonna build up?” We’ll probably have that data on about a dozen of those 72,000, to give
you some idea about the estimate of the magnitude once you get into this ball game of trying
to find out what you're dealing with and what you're not dealing with.
The chemical industries maintain a computer bank that they log in their new experimental
chemicals. That doesn't mean they’re gonna get on the market; they’re the ones that they’re
just generating to look at. They add about—by their own estimates a couple weeks ago—about
6,000 compounds a week, is the rate with which our research chemists dealing with industry
and the federal government, and the universities now, are generating new kinds of organic
compounds. They're gonna to have to be, you know, in one way or the other, tested,
investigated, explored.
Now, up to very recently, the mode of operating in this country was to take a compound like
this and put it in the market, to a great degree. There were only essentially three classes of
compounds that were regulated: Food and Drug had all the food and drug, EPA had pesticides,
and I believe the Treasury had tobacco and alcohol, okay? And those are the only classes of
compounds that were regulated. All others, basically, you’d go out and put ‘em on the market,
and you tried ‘em out empirically. Now, if you got a compound and had a usefulness and
somebody wanted to pay for it, you had a right to market it, and there was almost no

regulations on those. Now, as a result of two incidences, both PBB and Kepone—that’s one of
the reasons I picked these two case studies—that we had an act signed into law—federal law
now in this country—called the Toxic Materials Act, the Toxic Substances Act. I don’t know how
many of you have ever read it, but if you want to take it as a case study and to illustrate, you
know, to get people used to reading some of that stuff, it’s a classic one to take. It is probably
the most—I think, anyway—the most awesome piece of environmental legislation ever passed.
It’s gonna affect almost every industry in this country, and basically the act says this: the act
says that “the administrator of the EPA has a right and responsibility for any compound both
existing and new”—so it's retroactive. It’s every compound existing in the marketplace today
plus any new one that comes along—“to essentially require from the industry, if there's a
reasonable doubt about its safeness, evidence that will prove that the compound is safe before
they're allowed to market it.” It gives the administrator of the EPA the authority to stop the
production and sale of any chemicals that’s not in those first three classes. So every industrial
solvent, every plastic, every fiber, you know, you know the names. Stop and think about it. How
many industries? Everything from dry cleaning fluids, okay? All the way down through to what
you add in your clothes for fire retardants fall under this act. It’s as broad as anything could
possibly get, and the most interesting aspect of that thing is up ‘til now, we’ve operated under
the assumption that an industry can do something and is innocent until proven guilty—I mean,
that’s the way our system operates. Now we have a law that says, “No, we’ll assume it’s guilty,
as the burden of proof is on the industry to prove the compound safe.”
Now, stop. I don’t know how many of you have ever had statistics 101? Stop and think of the
scientific method. Do you know how the scientific method operates? Do you ever go out and
prove a hypothesis true? You always set up a null hypothesis as a false statement, okay? And
you don’t ever prove it true, but you try to disprove it. You say, “There's nothing there,” okay?
There is no effect and you don't ever prove it is, you just fail to find a certain effect over and
over and over again. If you test that long enough or hard enough under an array of different
environmental conditions and you reluctantly say, “Well, maybe, maybe it is true. Maybe
there’s no effect,” but you never prove that, do ya? Now, here we got the law of the land that
has turned the whole scientific method just backwards, mmkay? And you say, “Well, how the
heck can you get into this? How can we have a piece of legislation that affects, I don’t know,
80—90% of the industries in this country, improving people’s lifestyles, built on a logic that
seems just backwards?” Well, these two case studies were the two situations that forced that
through Congress. That piece of legislation was tied up, effectively lobbied against for six years.
Kepone and PBB both broke the same summer and the impact—60 Minutes and all the publicity
and all stuff that happened—that thing went sailing on through Congress; they had to do
something and they passed that act. Now, I'm not speaking against it, I’m just trying to lay out…
so you can judge yourself whether or not you think that kind of response to that kind of crisis is

an adequate thing. But let me back off now and walk you through the two case studies to give
you the specifics of it, and we’ll come back and talk about some of the general properties.
The first one I wanna walk you through is the Kepone situation. The Kepone, again, is this little
species I got drawn right here. If you look at… I don't know how many of you know the East
Coast, but that's the East shore, okay? Here’s the Chesapeake Bay, there’s the James River, and
it comes up and you got the York River, and there’s another—can’t remember the name of that
one—then there’s the Potomac River, Washington D.C. is right here, okay? And Maryland’s up
here. That's the Chesapeake Bay. Chesapeake Bay is—[breaking from lecture] can you all see
that? Close enough? [resuming] Chesapeake Bay is in a marine situation like the Great Lakes is
in the freshwater. It is the largest marine estuary other than Hudson Bay in the world, and if
you know anything about marine productivity, you realize the fact that most of the production
of the ocean takes place within the continental shelf—within the shore, you know, the
boundary areas of the shore—because you have essentially a lot of nutrients washing down
from erosion and so forth and freshwater is in the land; you have shallow waters that are
warm, and you have sunlight that penetrates to the bottom, and so the bulk of the fish
production, the bulk of the plant production in the ocean takes place within the continental
shelf within these estuaries. These are the major breeding grounds and major nursery grounds
for young oysters, young clams, young fish, young crabs, and everything else. In the East Coast,
our continental shelf goes out about 200 miles.
On the West Coast, yours is very short. The estuaries in the East Coast are far more important
to marine productivity; yours are all truncated because of that fault line, and you’re going to
the bottom real fast. But in the East Coast, we have a long continental shelf and that’s where
the bulk of that activity is. So, again, this is a non-trivial environmental resource. There's a little
plant right here, Hopewell, on the James River, just down from Richmond, and if you’ve seen
the 60 Minutes program, this was a little two-bit operation, and I mean that actually. It was a
chemical company that opened up in an old Phillips gasoline station in the little town of
Hopewell, and they took this filling station and they modified it into a production process.
Kepone was made by Allied Chemical. Allied Chemical was a big industrial firm in this country,
operating out of Baltimore. It operated a plant here in Hopewell up ‘til late 19… early—mid1960s, okay? And it became apparent that Kepone was going to be highly regulated by the
government because of its toxicology. They wanted to use that plant for something else, and so
two of the people that work for Allied spun off as Life Sciences and set up their own little
business. These were two Ph.D. chemists, all right? They had a very unique contract—they
show you the actual thing you get into when you deal with this—with a parent corporation, and
there was a parent corporation: Allied. They had a contract where Allied gave them all the raw
materials for nothing, and Allied was the sole source contact of buying back the Kepone once it

was made, okay? But yet, institutionally and legally, it was a free independent corporation, so if
you sued Life Sciences, you couldn't sue Allied, so they were absolutely clean—you know,
free—from any kind of potential liabilities, but yet they had this kind of legal contract with Life
Sciences.
Now, one of the problems in dealing with toxic materials is that—remember we talked about
anticipating environmental problems—when I'm dealing with radioactive waste, when I'm
dealing with heavy metals, when I dealing with thermal effluent, we at least have the option to
set up monitoring systems where you can go out and try to determine whether or not accidents
have taken place. I can hire a, potentially, a technician—a Bachelor of Science, chemistry
degree-type individual—put ‘em into the laboratory with standard chemical technology,
standard equipment, and I can monitor for mercury. I cannot monitor for lead. I can monitor for
radioactivity; I can, you know, give ‘em a thermometer, have ‘em measure temperature. The
problem is you don't monitor for organic compounds of this nature.
To give you some idea of the magnitude of the effort it takes to go out and determine whether
or not you have Kepone in your body, okay? Let me walk you through some examples. You have
probably seven to eight parts per million PCBs—that’s that polychlorinated biphenyl I talked
about this morning. Now, the FDA regulations say that the action level was five, which means if
we were a society of cannibals, none of you could be put on the market; you’re all unfit for
human consumption, okay? Now, if you found that very abrasive and didn’t believe it, let me
walk you through what it would take for me to actually make that determination on you. These
organic compounds—some of them are polar and some of them are nonpolar, that’s the
structure of the compound—they take different kinds of activity to extract it from your body, to
get it out of your body where I can measure how much I got, all right? These things are
basically… most of them lipophilic, that we call this, “fat soluble.” You’ve got to take some kind
of solvent, then you gotta put ‘em in solution and something, okay? And different compounds
have different solvents. And it’s the solvent I would use to extract Kepone will not extract DDT.
The solvent technique I use to extract Kepone from oysters will not work on human beings; had
to develop a different ki… a different technique for humans than I do for oysters. That is, to
really define, to refine a technology, you just extract this stuff to work with it. I really have to
know what the compound is and I have to develop a different technique for each bloody piece
of tissue I’m gonna work with. So what I do is I put you in a whirring blender and I grind you all
up, make a mush outta ya, okay? And then I use some kind of a solvent to extract that organic
compound. Now, the problem is two. One is some things don't get extracted; better use the
right solvent. In the other case, you can get many of them coming out together. Remember I
mentioned this morning that much of our stuff on DDT that we talked about turns out to be a
bum rap that was PCBs? They both came out together with the same extraction techniques,

and it was about, well, was the early 1960s before we learned to separate the two. So a lot of
things we thought were one turned out to be masked; the other was hidden along with it.
So you got both classes of problems. So you bring the stuff out and then what you do is you
have to somehow refine it, clean it up, and you run it through some kind of a gas analyzer. We
use—what we’re now using is a capillary gas chromatograph. What they do is they put it in a
little dish and they flame it real hot, make a gas out of it, and shoot it down a long glass tube
and each compound goes a different distance, all right? Depending on the size of the molecule
and its polarity, some of ‘em only travel short distance and stop, others go a long distance. And
what you get, then, is a graph where this is retention time, all right? The bloody thing looks like
a porcupine, like this, okay? This is what a sample, for instance, from an oyster from the
Chesapeake will look like. We got these last month. One of those spikes is Kepone. One of those
spikes might be DDT. One of those spikes might be PCBs. A typical oyster sample for the
Chesapeake has about 520 spikes in it. We know what probably a dozen of those compounds
are, we can identify. The other 500-510 compounds are the environmental crises of the future.
We know they’re there. We know that every one of those, by the way, every one of those
spikes is a man-made, synthetic, halogenated hydrocarbon. There's not a natural organic in that
particular technique, and won’t come out with that technique. So these are all existing, you
know, chemicals out there in the environment.
We have been doing the same thing with human milk in Michigan since PBB, monitoring as a
service to women, ‘cause they wanna know whether they should breastfeed their kids. We get
somewhere around 300 to 320 spikes in a typical sample of milk from people in Michigan. To
essentially take one of these spikes that you don't know and make it into a known, to do the
kind of research chemistry it takes to extract it, identify it, purify it, it’d cost about $10,000 per
spike, mmkay? Now, that's the cost it would take. It takes about 18 hours of bench chemistry
for you to do one oyster sample, mmkay? Once you know what you’re looking for. Costs about
$10,000 just to get it ‘til you know what it is. Now, that’s a magnitude of the time and effort it
takes a Ph.D. organic chemist to do the research, and it almost takes a Ph.D. physicist just to get
the machines working, mmkay?
Now, there isn’t any state or local community that can afford to go out and monitor your
environment for organic contaminants with that kind of technology, can they? I mean, yeah,
we’ve now geared ourselves up to look for PBB in Michigan; that's about all we can do. We
know the rest are there, there's no way we can go out and monitor it. So this is one of the
reasons I put this class of problems as kind of high in a priority of social conflict, because almost
by definition, it's gonna be crisis reaction. We aren't gonna know we have the problem until we
see a localized effect. There isn't a single environmental episode that I know of that we

anticipated ahead of time. Every one that I personally know of like Kepone, methylmercury:
cats were dancing in circles, PBB: cattle, their hooves were growing up, Kepone: the workers
got the shakes. The first indication was their effect on people or animals out in the environment
and then we scrambled like hell to try to find out what it was, how far it went, how long it's
been there, who got hurt; and that is the most difficult kind of decision-making. And one of the
most difficult things is in that early stage of a crisis when all you’ve got is the shakes, or all you
got is cattle that are knock-kneed, and people demanding to know what's going on, that's
where the decision-maker is most vulnerable and that's where, if I had to name one major thing
we gotta learn how to do, is how to discipline a society during the early phases of one of these
things so you don't overreact. ‘Cause there isn’t, you know, isn’t any point in going out and
beating on the governor or beating on the director of agriculture and demanding that your
environmental officers tell you what's going on—they don't not [do not] know, and there isn’t
anyway to find out, at least not in the short run.
Now, what happened with the Kepone situation is exactly that. There was a worker here at the
plant… that the symptoms of Kepone toxicology is you get shakes. If you saw that 60-minute
program, the guy couldn't even put a screwdriver into the head of a screw, his hand was
shaking so badly. You get peripheral vision, your eyes don't focus. This guy went into his local
general practitioners—his doctor—in Hopewell, a small little town in south Virginia; ‘course
they didn’t know anything about Kepone. The first couple times they went in, they gave him a
tranquilizer and sent him home. They said, you know, they did the normal kind of diagnostic,
medical diagnostic tests, nothing showed up! They didn’t see anything. “Well, it must be stress.
You must be overworked, okay?” And literally, they sent him home, told him to take a couple
days off and rest and they came back, and of course as they came back and picked up the same
symptoms right again. And eventually, this guy, about the third time, met up with a Taiwanese
intern, one of these young, aggressive guys that was gonna make sure it was done right, and he
had enough sense to essentially take a blood sample and sent it to the toxicology, the
community disease center there in Atlanta, Georgia [Center for Disease Control or CDC], and
had enough sense to ask the guy, “Well, what are you making in that little plant?” He said,
“Well, Kepone.” Well, they didn’t know what Kepone was, but he passed it along and these
guys did analysis and found about 7 parts per million in the blood. Now this was actually in the
blood of the worker, and if you know anything about physiology, that’s a very high level. That’s
not in the fat, that’s actively circulating in your blood system; 7 parts per million is very high.
So, immediately, they call up the state of Virginia, they shut down the plant, the various
occupational health safety people and MDs and so forth went and looked around in this little
garage. You walked into this place, there were 30 workers in there. The Kepone dust was so
thick in the air you could hardly see across the room. It was up to 6, 8 inches in the corners, just

sittin’ there, just Kepone dust, and people had no protective gear, they had no face masks, they
had no protective clothing at all; and this was not 1820, this was four years ago, okay? I mean,
it’s not as if somehow we’re back in the 1800s and we don’t know any better, all right?
Everybody in that room had the shakes in some form. They immediately, you know, shut down
the plant, they begin to follow this stuff out, ‘course these people went home and they took the
Kepone home and dust in their clothes with ‘em and their family, their houses were
contaminated. The contamination was less ‘cause the intensity was less, so the human health
problems didn’t show up, but you could measure it there. They looked at the air samples; EPA
ran one of these dust collectors over the city of Hopewell. The dust was about 10% by weight
Kepone in the air in that dust collector. They went out and they sampled the soil around the
plant and of course they would take these things out and bag it, and they were kind of sloppy
about it and they’d bust a bag and it’d fall on the ground, and there were… percent by weight
Kepone in the ground around the plant itself, all right? You know, cause the further they
looked, the more they found. They then immediately began to worry about aquatic discharges
and they got a hold of the town of Hopewell and it turned out that these people—remember I
mentioned this morning that the municipal hookup, the industrial hookup and municipal
plants? They’d initially hooked up the sewage treatment plant in little Hopewell and completely
killed all the bacteria in the plant—wiped it right out, okay? And the engineer fired it back up
and figured out it must be this garage, and his solution to the problem, they gave him a permit
to dump directly into the James River.
Well, know, here’s some sanitation engineer working in a small town of Hopewell, what the hell
does he know about Kepone, organic compounds. You shouldn’t expect him to be a synthetic
organic chemist. No, you know, he said, “Well, whatever it was, we’ll just, you know… you
haven't got very much, we’ll just do it that way,” and of course immediately then they began to
worry about what happened in the aquatics, ‘cause this was a direct discharge right into the
James River. ‘Course the company meeting when this happened, the workers, you know, these
guys were permanently sterile, all 30 of ‘em; they were between 25 and 30 or 35 years of age.
They went back through the medical records in terms of births over the last 10 years of that
plant and it was something like only three births of all the workers and their families in
something like 10 years and only one of them was normal, which was very low, percentagewise, OK, it might be just luck of the draw; on the other hand, there’s a good indication it
wasn’t.
So immediately these people wanted, you know, to sue somebody, but, you know in Hopewell,
little town… little Life Sciences declared bankruptcy. Again, it’s a typical thing that you find you
got a small undercapitalized industry—they’ve got nothin’ to lose! They got no capital
investment in a plant so immediately they declare bankruptcy, and the law allows them to flee,

you know, clean and green. Absolutely. And, of course the workers wanna sue Allied, which is
the big corporation, and they said, “Look, you guys don’t work for us. You’re an independent
operation.” Okay? So the only person left to pick up the difference was the state of Virginia
which is not… you know, the whole budget wouldn’t pay for this thing. So the federal
government eventually is gonna get stuck with the bill on this, and most of the situation we’ve
run into where this happens is it's not a great big corporation; sometimes it is, [but] many times
it’s these small little independent operations that are so small they’re cutting corners.
Now as it turns out, as a result of crapping this stuff out in the James River, instead of
monitoring oysters and blue crabs and bluefish and so forth in the James River, these people
dumped 100,000 pounds of it, okay? Over about a year-and-a-half period. That’s 10% of their
total production, and if you saw that 60 Minutes program where these two guys said, “Gee,
we’re sorry, we didn’t know it was toxic.” With all due respect, they’re both Ph.D. chemists and
working on the toxicology of that compound for about 20 years, at least 15 years, all right?
Now, the question, then, comes, to what do you do? We have in the James River now—if you
look at this and blow it up—up until 6 months ago, we were hoping that the Kepone would stay
in the James River. Now, here’s what you call a “salt wedge.” If you look at a tidal river, if this is
the ocean going that way, all right, the fresh water flows along the surface ‘cause it's lighter
than salt water, and rides out over the top of an estuary like this and the salt water then, what
happens is there is a diffusion upwards of salt water, and it causes a vector that causes salt
water to flow upward. So in the Chesapeake Bay, fresh water flows on across the top and salt
water flows upstream across the bottom. And there was a zone which they call a zone of…
essentially, negative or neutral transport; it’s a deposition zone of particles of silt and so forth.
Kepone adheres to small soil particles, and as it’s carried down the river, these things are
deposited because of this counter-current flow in the zone. So if you looked at the river, the
Kepone was distributed like that. Now if you take 100,000 pounds of Kepone and you take the
toxicology—the FDA standards right now are 3/10ths of a part per million—that any fish above
3/10s of a part per million you can’t commercially put into state commerce, and you take that
and multiply it times the number of pound of fish it would take if that 100,000 pounds were
uniformly distributed, okay? And not only is it capable of completely contaminating the whole
Chesapeake Bay, but if you really distribute uniformly, the whole Atlantic Ocean in terms of
getting the fish in the Atlantic Ocean above the action level of the FDA.
So we're talking about, now, a situation where what do you do? Here you’ve got a compound
that is stable as the devil, it’s toxic, we’ve done the toxicology of it and normally what they will
do in analyzing toxicology—you might ask the question of how does the FDA come up with the
number 3/10ths of a part per million? It’s a very interesting one to look at. The basic problem of
course is what they need to do is determine what level of fish could you eat… well, I’m saying,

what amount of fish could you eat for each level of Kepone in the fish, so you don’t exceed your
body tolerance, your ability to process that compound or at least tolerate it. So what you first
have to do is decide what’s the toxicology of Kepone. Now, to do toxicology, obviously, you’d
want to do it on human beings; we can't do it that way. The next best model would be
monkeys, at least they’re primates. With the cost of monkeys, you can't do that either. So
basically what they use are carcinogenic prone strains of white mice, highly inbred strains of
white mice, that are sensitive to certain kinds of pathologies, and they use these as supposedly
very sensitive indicators [of] the toxicology of this compound.
Now, there are two levels of screening for toxicology. One is… no, you can't go out… we did it
with Kepone with mice, but they’ve also done it with other mammal type things as well; but
when you first get in with this, you’re not really sure what you should spend your money on; it
takes a lot of time and money to go out and test for one of these compounds. They have what
they call the AIMS test. The AIMS test is a quick and dirty look of solution that uses bacteria,
and what it really is doing is one of the theories of cancer is that it’s a mutation—a genetic
mutation—that initiates, okay, a biochemical event, and it’s a latency period because there are
controls on that gene that don’t allow it to be expressed, and sometime in the future, then,
there is a genetic shift in the body that releases that expression and cancer’s expressed. Now,
the latency period can be anywhere from 8 to 40 years. So the question is, how do you test for
carcinogenic material if you don't expect it to show up for a 40-year period? Well, you obviously
can't test for that directly, can ya? So you gotta test for it in an indirect fashion.
Well, the AIMS test is one of the ways to do that. What it is if you take a bacteria that cannot
grow in a growth media, you put it on, [claps] it dies every time, so you expose that bacteria to
your mutagen, right? Your mutagenic material, and if it then mutates to the point that you get a
little plaque, that’s what the AIMS test is. And for certain kinds of compounds, it’s about 95%
efficient; that you really don’t know it’s carcinogenic, but at least you know it’s mutagenic and
that it’s potentially a carcinogen. Then if you find that it’s mutagenic then you test it with white
mice, spend a hell of a lot of time, and money and effort. And during that period of time, of
course, the decision-maker doesn’t know whether he’s got himself something that’s good or
bad, does he? And that’s that time lag in decision-making that you can’t help—it’s built into the
science of the system.
Now, when this thing first broke, and this information came out, they really didn't have very
good standards. The EPA set—and FDA set—the level at 1/10th of a part per million. The fish
had more than that. The governor was faced with a decision. He shut down the bluefish, crabs,
and oysters in the whole Chesapeake Bay, and that’s just like our salmon—that's a hundreds of
a million dollar annual budget. I mean, you know, that's a water-oriented economy; the

watermen in the Chesapeake make their living off that bay, and it’s a tremendous economic
impact that you’re shuttin’ that thing down. But the governor was very reluctant to do that, and
he did two things: he first said, “Well, let's hold up the information. There’s no point in sending
this stuff out ‘cause we don’t know what it means yet,” and put up a moratorium on the release
of this information to the public and said, “Guys, we will protect the public by putting more
inspectors” […] on the fisheries—“we will hire, you know, a lot more meat inspectors for the
Department of Agriculture and we’ll monitor this fish, and if we find any contaminated fish,
we’ll take it off the market,” all right? You might think well, that's a good trade-off. Well, the
problem is think about the time lag in terms of monitoring this compound—remember I walked
you through the technique of doing it? You go out, you collect fish off the market—the FDA
does not monitor anything in the environment, all of your food quality monitoring is market
basket sampling. All the FDA sampling for food quality—so they go to the store, they go to the
fish market, and they take a sample off the shelf. They don't do it when it's out in the
environment, mmkay? And by the time it’s there—if it’s a fresh fish, it isn’t gonna stay very long
on the market, is it? They take the added sample of fish, they’d send it to a biochemical lab, it’d
take about 48 to 72 hours to get the samples back—sometimes as many as five days. By then,
by the time you got the information, those fish were already eaten or rotten, okay? So
obviously that system didn't work and blew up in their face, and became a real social issue.
They re-analyzed the numbers that they were doing. The FDA set the level initially at 1/10th of
a part per million, and let me tell you how they get that number. They did the toxicology and
they got it down in the parts per million when the stuff was not causing cancer was passing
urine in… a protein in the urine which means something was going on. So they didn't find a zero
safe level, all right? But what they decided to do, they put a margin of error of a thousand—
they find that number and they divide it by 1000. It’s the same way an engineer would put a,
you know, 15% margin of error on the stress of a bridge, just to make sure his calculations were
robust; this is same thing biochemically, and they usually use a factor of either a hundred or a
thousand—set the number three decimal places over [to] the left, okay? And then what you
got—that’s a toxicology level—that’s the ambient level of your blood that’s safe, then you have
to decide: well, what’s the level in the fish that associates with that? So you have to decide how
much fish do you eat? And it turns out, the average fish consumption in the United States is 19
grams a week, it’s a 145-pound man in Des Moines, Iowa, okay? And so the FDA takes that
calculation and looks at what level of Kepone in the fish would it take if you ate 19 grams a
week, so that your body level will not exceed 1/10 of a part per million, mmkay? And it turned
out to be that the fish in the bay were over that level and would not be legally sold. The state
went back and re-analyzed it, and of course the watermen don't eat 19 grams, they eat a hell of
a lot more than that, but the FDA also assumed that Kepone will be in all the food, not just fish:
dairy, poultry, beef, and everything else, and so if you make the various—‘scuse me—

readjustments in terms of concentration, the estimate come out to be 3/10ths of a part per
million—the fish had .29, okay? Just below it, and they opened the fisheries back up.
That was a year-and-a-half ago. Unfortunately… remember I mentioned the salt wedge? That
salt wedge kept that Kepone right there in a fairly narrow band. Last year, we had a drought on
the East Coast and that salt/freshwater interface moved upstream about 20 miles and the
samples we’ve taken for the last, oh, 6-7 months, looks as if that wedge is moving downstream
now. It’s gone through the barrier. I’ll go back and look at my James River, give you a bit more
on the biology of it. Right here, the Kepone wedge is about right there, and now it's beginning
to move. That position right there is where all the seed oysters from the whole Chesapeake Bay
come from. I don't know whether… how many of you ever been in the East Coast, but oysters
out in the East Coast are a delicacy, they’re like the abalone out here, okay? And they fish farm
oysters by—this happens to be just the right salinity and right velocity, right sediment—oysters
throw their spat out in the open ocean. They have to settle out, they have to get a very high
percent survivorship right here and the way the oyster farmers work, they come down they
collect the young spats, here, and they move them up to other places in the bay, and two years
later they come and harvest the oysters; it’s a two-year fishery.
But the total reproduction of the whole oyster fishery in the Chesapeake comes right there.
Every female blue crab in the Chesapeake Bay spawns right here. Blue crab also is a marine
delicacy in the East Coast. What happens is they ride that salt wedge upstream, the young
larvae do, and mature up in the upper rivers and bays and in the whole Chesapeake. The
females, when they get ready to mature, walk all the way down here, and that’s the total
breeding ground for all the blue crabs in Chesapeake Bay. Remember I talked about the salmon
migrating from salt to fresh water? And they holed up in these estuaries? All of the bluefish, all
of the flounder, all of the spot, all the striped bass that migrate into the Chesapeake from the
ocean on their migratory runs stop and spend three to four to five weeks right here in the bay,
making this physiological shift. If you had to find a place to which you would not want to inject
a load of toxic materials into a critical ecosystem, you couldn't find a worse ecosystem and a
more unfortunate position than what you have right now.
The governor of Virginia, now, has got about eight to nine months to make a decision. What
does he do? It’s very easy to say, “Well, we'll go out and we'll sue ‘em, we’ll put ‘em in jail.”
That ain’t gonna help Chesapeake Bay, is it? From a scientific point of view, you know, the
question is, what kind of mitigating options do you have? All of ‘em are extremely expensive.
The Army Corps of Engineers, for instance, has investigated the feasibility of dredging. They
love to dredge—they got all kinds of boats, all kinds of machines, all kinds of people, okay? To
dredge the James River right here, [pointing on a map] right here, it’s about two and a half

miles wide, here it’s about four and a half miles wide. About 8 feet deep; big, wide, shallow. To
dredge that Kepone—of course it’d be mixed with the winds, be mixed with the tidal currents,
be mixed with the worms and crabs and so forth that chew up the mud, okay? So it’s essentially
infiltrated a couple feet of sediments. The spoil site would be about 30 square miles, about 8
feet tall. The estimate, even if you found a place to put it—and someone would have to write
an environmental impact statement on that and nobody would want to live next to it, okay?—
the estimate on that was about 3 billion dollars—that’s B, billion, okay? Another alternative was
to dam off the James River here and here, divert the James River into the York, which would
completely destroy the lower James and essentially just dam it off and isolate it. The estimate
of that, if you don't consider the fact that all the Norfolk, okay, and Newport News Navy yards
are all right in here—all your major shipbuilding and your big Navy ports are all between those
two barriers—just the project itself, the estimate was somewhere around 9 billion dollars.
Another proposal was to impregnate a resin, okay? Some kind of an organic resin as an
absorber to Kepone—something that would absorb Kepone with more infinity that the
sentiments would themselves—and impregnate it with metal filings, put it out there, come
back around with a big magnet and pick them up. See if you can't retrieve it. Unfortunately,
there’s not enough resin made in the world to do it. The estimate of that was about 13 billion
dollars.
And I'm not being facetious; these are actually the kind of things they’re talkin’ about, okay? As
far as I know, nobody has a technically and economically feasible alternative I know of right
now. The governor is faced with a rather difficult decision. I used to say that, up ‘til this
situation came along, I couldn't think of an example where an environmental toxicant caused
major ecological disruption, the same way that [...] did, this morning that I talked about. Here is
the exception. The Kepone apparently is toxic enough that we’re now monitoring blue crabs
and spot in the lower James River, and the populations seem to be going to zero. In most cases
with environmental toxicants, it didn't kill ecology, it just pre-empted your use of it. The PCBs
don't kill my salmon, you just can’t consume ‘em, okay? And up ‘til recently, we thought the
same situation with Kepone: that we set our environmental standards for health purposes and
they’re so rigorous that we never did see ecological damage. Here’s a case where, apparently,
what it looks like, is it’s intense enough and toxic enough that it’s destroying the fauna and flora
in the lower James River. Now, but even that is not entirely an ubiquitous thing; for instance,
the two species of catfish that live in the James River… side by side, two species of catfish! One
of ‘em accumulates Kepone in high concentration, the other’s got none in it at all, and they
sleep side by side and eat the same food. They have some different biochemical thing that
apparently they’re urinating it out or processing it in some form so one of ‘em you can eat, and
one of ‘em you can't touch, okay? One of ‘em’s loaded, one of ‘em isn’t.

Now, where this goes… I don't know yet. If you talk to the people in the lower Chesapeake, they
think the problem’s gone away; they haven’t read about it in the paper for the last six years—
well, the last six months, year and a half, alright? We made a big splash, everybody was
concerned. The problem is more difficult now than it was before. I guess one of the questions
you could struggle with in terms of your policy issues is whether or not you should release that
information to the public and generate the crisis all over again. When this thing hit, all right,
initially, the only contaminated seafood was right here in the James River, okay? The oysters,
the blue crabs, the stripers further up in the estuary were not contaminated, and yet, when the
information went to the public, there was a total depression of all seafood consumption all the
way from North Carolina to Boston, mmkay? I mean, just total! Total deprivation of economic
interest in seafood right across. Same thing happened in PBB; we contaminated the dairy cattle,
you couldn't sell any Michigan produce—meat produce: dairy, poultry, beef, chicken, swine,
you name it, okay? That is, the public was not—[you] know, we find enough to be able to
realize that it was one hotspot that was dangerous, all the area around it was clean. The only
contamination, initially, into the Chesapeake was a bluefish that came in and migrated, all
right? It was two populations of bluefish: one came up in the James and came back out again
and the other one went straight up. If you actually plot Kepone in the populations, it was
bimodal; these were the ones that migrated in, these are the ones that didn't. Trouble is, you
couldn’t tell by looking at the bluefish which ones were contaminated, okay? Only an organic
chemist could tell you, and you wouldn’t have the money to find out.
The other interesting thing is: here’s Maryland. Blue crabs in Maryland didn’t have any Kepone.
Distribution of Kepone in public record stops right there, and by political declaration, blue crabs
in Maryland were clean, okay? [laughter] We had the same thing true with PBB in Michigan—
Ohio [and] Indiana didn't have any PBB. The distributional boundary was a nice, straight line.
Just amazing how well-behaved that chemical was. So you also get several of these kinds of
patterns.
Well, it's… probably the best example I can give you to illustrate the complexity of that
problem. I can't sit here and give you neat solutions like I can with some of the other ones; we
don't know what to do with this one. If you've noticed that Allied Chemical got fined thirteen
and a half million dollars, which is the largest pollution fine I know of in this country. It’s kinda
interesting how that happened ‘cause Allied Chem went, “Not us! We had nothin’ to do with
it!” Life Sciences declared bankruptcy, we couldn't sue them. All right, what happened was Bob
Huggett, who’s a biochemist, a marine geochemist, down here at the Virginia center for marine
sciences right on the lower Chesapeake, had been studying DDT and oysters, blue crabs, and
fish back in 1955… 1958, in that period, and had put fish in his freezer and kept ‘em. And this
was back in the time before Life Sciences was operating and Allied was still operating the plant,

so he went back and he got those fish out of the freezer and he analyzed ‘em. And they had as
much Kepone back in ‘58 as they had in ‘75, and that was the information that the judge used
to fine Allied Chemical thirteen and a half million dollars. If those fish had not been in the
freezer, that industry would have not been fined one dime, they’re absolutely legally free,
mmkay?
Now, this kind of a situation, there isn’t any way that people are gonna ignore that. You see one
of those things and, you know, the impact on the people in Virginia was devastating, and it still
is, and if we don't find a solution to that, that thing is going to be his head again, and again,
again for a long period of time. That's the kind of case study, all right, that was a major
motivating force behind the Toxic Materials Act. The state of Virginia attempted to essentially
handle it bureaucratically and it blew up in their face, with a lot of alienation between the
people and the government. It was a situation that—I can't prove it—EPA tried to get criminal
action against the officials of Life Sciences and to get criminal action, you gotta prove intent to
hurt, and they couldn't prove that so they dropped their case. There's no question in my mind
that these people didn't know what they were doing. They knew—they designed—they built
Kepone, they had the patent on it, they developed it. They knew damn well what its toxicology
was, okay? And now anybody—nobody dumps 10% of their productivity… A lot of it was
dumped at night; we have a sanitation landfill down there now. They dumped a lot of the stuff
at night, didn’t tell anybody. There’s contaminated groundwater. The more you look, the more
you find. It’s probably an extreme case in terms of industrial irresponsibility, but I can show you
cases in Michigan of not quite this scale where the same kind of thing goes on, particularly with
small, independent industrial waste haulers, particularly with small, small corporations that are
just getting started that are operating in a very margin so they gotta cut corners just to stay
alive. That's where, essentially, you run into this kind of a risk.
Now, the other situation was PBB in Michigan, and it has some similar things so I won't repeat
those, but it also has some different properties. PBB is polybrominated biphenyl. This is a fire
retardant. It’s a compound—in this case, it didn't intentionally be dumped in the environment.
It’s a compound that accidentally got mixed up in the dairy feed. There was a small Michigan
Chemical operating here in the state [pointing to map] right about there, all right? It was
making this as a fire retardant… It’s kind of interesting, you can go back in the records and
both—I believe it was DuPont and Dow Chemical looked at this product about 10 years ago and
decided not to make it. There’s many other ways to make fire retardants, and it was in their
own judgment that this thing was too environmentally risky and didn't need to run the risk of
further environmental contamination to make a product to sell; they had other alternatives.
Michigan Chemical was, again, a very small little operation—they own the bromine deposits
there in Michigan—and so in the same little constellation of buildings, they were making this

PBB, this FireMaster, as it was called, all right? In the same—right next door in the same little
shed—right next to that shed—they were making an animal feed that was a nitrogen oxide that
went into magnesium oxide, it was an additive in dairy products called [Nutri]Master. So these
two little sheds side by side, one of ‘em making FireMaster, one of ‘em making [Nutri]Master,
both brown sacks with different labels, okay? You know, just the same label but different
names. And here’s some guy making a buck sixty-five an hour runnin’ a front-end loader, okay?
The invoice comes along that says, “I want the 18 sacks of animal feed.” The guy makes a
mistake and loads up FireMaster instead, okay? Now, again, in this particular case it was
documented—it was a human accident—but here you got a case where you got a routinized
job, okay? We all know from past experience that where you expect human error is where
you’ve got some mundane job you do it, you know, 20 times a day and after a while you get—
you don’t even read anymore—you go, you just pick it up and do it. It's just a matter of time
before that happens.
So the message there is you shouldn't allow any storage, transportation, and production of a
toxic material and something that goes in animal feed in the same facility, okay? For the same
reason hospitals, they don't put, you know, salt and sugar in maternity wards or in the, you
know, baby wards, because it’s just too damn easy to mix ‘em up. So you just absolutely
separate the whole support system; so physically, you start with the assumption a human
error’s gonna happen, and you make the system idiot-proof. There’s no way you could protect
yourself from a human error in a situation like that; that's the message we learned from this
one, but we learned it the hard way.
What happened is this stuff got mixed in, it went off to Michigan Farm Bureau, okay? Michigan
Farm Bureau is a quasi public/private institution set up for farmers—it’s their own institution! It
wasn't out to, you know, it wasn’t out to damage its own society. The guy there—two human
errors back-to-back. The invoice says “animal feed,” the bag says the mix… you know,
FireMaster. It was probably mixed mechanically, the guy didn’t even read it. It went in. It wasn’t
caught. The stuff diffuses out to the state and it’s animal feed, and that’s the reason that I know
damn well that it went cross to Indiana and Ohio ‘cause I’ve talked to the guys that transported
it, but those states formally didn’t have PBB. But it essentially goes out to all the little, you
know, farm communities with their local graneries, and the guy comes in, he grinds his corn, he
dries it, he adds it to animal feed, he sells some of that to his neighbors, there’s an instant
diffusion system that goes like that. There’s an infrastructure, in this case, that maximized the
rate with which that stuff spread.
Now, again, we have the Department of Agriculture, it’s a regulatory agency. We have a lot of
meat inspectors and dairy inspectors whose job it is to go out and systematically monitor, you

know, milk and cheese and butter, ice cream, from all the dairy, you know, farms in Michigan to
guarantee food quality [so] that this kind of stuff would not get into the human food chain. But
the problem is, what do you monitor for? Remember I mentioned, you monitor for what? The
standard crises of 10 years ago, ‘cause you've got standard off-the-shelf technology—you got
standard equipment, you’re handling 200 samples a day, all right? It takes two days to handle
one milk sample to do an analysis of PBB. There’s no way you’re gonna systematically monitor
for that, besides, nobody expected it anyway! How would you know which organic compound
you should monitor, from—of the two million that are out there! So there’s no way! All right?
So what happened, this thing goes out, several weeks go by, nobody catches it. The farmers
come in, they’re probably right across from them, they say, “Hey, my cow is sick.” Say, “Well,
what do you mean they’re sick?” “Well, they don’t look good! Their eyes are droopy, you
know?” They go out and they milk the cow twice a day. It’s like your dog; you can tell when he’s
not feeling well, he just kinda droops around. The point is that they couldn’t quantify it, they
couldn’t put a number on it, they couldn’t be very specific about it. Department of Agriculture,
I’m from Michigan State University, a land grant institution. We have a whole extension
service—experiment service—that goes out and helps farmers, and they sent out a group of,
you know, experts, nutrition, bacteria, that kind of stuff, they looked around, didn’t find
anything. Came back and filed a report, said, “Must’ve been mismanagement.” Okay? Exactly
the same response as what? The doctor giving that guy a tranquilizer, right? The standard kind
of diagnostic pathologies weren’t there. So you say, “Well, this must just be in their head. There
must be something that’s kind of soft.” The point is the existing agencies are so… push so hard
with existing regulatory… they haven't got time for a crisis. They don't want one. It’s not [that]
they don’t care, it’s that they—before they stop doing what they’re normally gonna do—just
keeping permits flowing, and keeping the system operating—you gotta convince them that’s
got something’s that’s a crisis. You can't expect them to just be sittin’ there waiting for you to
come in, and say, “Hey doc, I got a problem.” All right?
And so it goes on, several weeks go by. The guys come in—farmers come in—they’re keepin’,
you know, records of the milk production. It's going down in time. Now you got somethin’
quantitative. Aha! Somethin’ real. It’s goin’ on. You go out, you do your… again, normal kinds of
investigation, nothing shows up—everything’s negative. Now, stop and think about it. What
does a negative sign mean? What if you go out and see a big fat zero? I go out and monitor, I
don’t find somethin’. Does that mean it’s safe? Or does that mean, for all you know, you
haven't measured the right thing? That's the reason for no hypotheses being like they are. If I
measure somethin’ and I find it, I know where I am. I don't find it, I don't know where I am. Zero
could either be nothing’s there, or zero could be: I’m using the long observational technique
and I'm not gonna see it, and you can never tell the difference, okay? That's the reason the law

was written the way it was, and it’s the reason scientists operate that way… but the law today
says it’s the opposite, all right?
Now, eventually what happened is… this’s about 6-8 months now. Actually, the pathology in the
cattle by now is really gross; their hooves grow up—have you ever see that? If you saw the 60
Minutes—grow up in great, big arcs like this. They get knock-kneed, okay? Bow-legged. And
they’re actually droppin’ dead on the ground, so that everybody knew we’d get something
wrong now. So they quarantine the cattle. What they’re doin’ is… you go to the biochemist, you
go to the toxicologists, and say, “What’s the safe level?” Well, there’s no studies been done!
You know, you go in to your University and say, “Tell me about the toxicology of PBB.” You go
to […] and nothing's gonna be there. That’s a typical kind of situation. Things are there for the
past crises, not the new ones. So for a while, again, the decision-maker, what the hell do you
do?
Now, when they first got into this thing, it took ‘em about nine months to find out, and the first
indication was a little bit of bromine. As it turns out, as I mentioned this morning, Michigan has
three big industries and they’re all energy intensive. That was the summer of the oil embargo.
So here’s automobiles and recreation in a big economic slump, and you’ve got a little bit of data
that says bromine in animal feed, and you don’t have any idea where the hell it came from,
okay? And you shut down the third remaining industry. Boy, you talk about someone being in
the hot seat. Okay? It’s really easy to be at Monday morning quarterback three years later
saying he shoulda had better insight, okay? But if you're the guy sittin’ there with that kind of
information, I tell ya it's one heck of a different situation as to how… what you’re gonna do and
how you’re gonna justify it.
As it turns out, what they were doing was that they were setting their standards, in terms of
action levels, by what they could measure, and it was 5 parts per million. Then they could get
better technology and it was 4 parts per million, and each time they dropped a level, of course,
the state had to quarantine another three to four to five thousand cattle. They finally got it
down to 3 parts per million, okay, and everybody’s sayin’, “Hey guys, this is safe. Relax, PBB is
not that toxic. It’s only mildly toxic, nowhere near as toxic as Kepone, okay? And we’re
beginning to get toxicological data and it doesn’t look like it’s that dangerous.” Of course, the
public exposed to this thing is not very sympathetic by now. In Michigan, the data went right
from the biochemist’s shelf immediately into the newspapers. It was the opposite of Virginia.
Direct, one-way flow. It was sensationalized, the whole works. You could read articles in the
Grand Rapids newspapers by editors editorializing on this thing where they’re debating
whether the kids of these farmer families that consumed dairy products before it was diluted
with uncontaminated milk, whether they’ll live past the age of 21. They did some surveys in

terms of surveying these kids as to whether or not there were, you know, health statistic
problems you could identify, and of course the parents of these farm kids claimed that they
were, you know, all kinds of things they were seeing: they didn’t sleep well, their grades were
dropping, they were very, you know, they were very psychologically disturbed, but what’s it
due to? It is due to, essentially, the toxicological effects of this compound? Or is it due to all the
stress of the economic dislocation of the farms? Or the fact that now they’re sensitive to it,
they’re seeing things they just weren’t observing before? How the hell do you tell? You know,
that kind of data is almost uninterpretable, there’s no way that you could tell what the heck
that looks like.
About this stage of the game, we had buried over 25,000 dairy cattle. Okay? You talk about the
economic impact where the state quarantined these things, shot ‘em, and buried ‘em.
Tremendous economic impact on the farm families, and if you don’t know anything about dairy
herds: you don’t go and buy a dairy herd, you breed ‘em. You know, these are handed down
from father to son. One calf a year, genetically inbred, you know, very highly controlled. It’s
part of the farm community, you don’t just go out and commercialize somethin’ like that.
There’s no way you could put a dollar value on it, okay? At this stage of the game, the governor
was really takin’ a beatin’—the whole state legislature was takin’ a beatin’, okay? Saying that,
“Well, we’ll go out, we’ll bring in some external experts. We’ll bring in some independent… a
panel of independent blue ribbon people to give us our credibility.” And Professor Selikoff, who
was a very fine toxicologist from New York Sinai Hospital, came in with a team of people and he
looked at this and he saw just about the same literature that existed, of course, “Well, there's
nothing there!” And after three or four months study, they released to the newspapers their
results and essentially they said, “We don't know about PBB, so there’s no data. But PBB—”
listen to this now, “—it’s a close chemical cousin to PCB, and PCBs are thought to be
carcinogenic, and so if you have to err, you should err on the conservative side and if you
should… if you can measure it, you better kill the cattle,” and [they] recommended one part per
billion… okay? Which is one hell of a gap. A 300-fold difference. Now, what little credibility was
left in state government at that stage of the game went right down the tubes. I mean, the
impact of that onto the… you know, the average person walkin’ the street only can believe
what he reads. And what this meant was that for the individual, every blue ribbon committee
absolutely said, “Hey, state government has been conning you right down the line.” Okay?
Now, this was about a year-and-a-half ago. Our state… the federal government kept the level
there. Our state government, with tremendous trauma of public hearings and so forth in the
last nine months, went through all kinds of investigations and public hearings and people
claiming their kids were killed and other people claiming it's all in their mind and the whole
works, and decided to set the state level at 20 parts per billion, which is the lowest level that’s

quantitatively detectable. We now have something like four to five hundred cattle. So we had
buried most of ‘em up to here. We didn’t have anywhere to incinerate ‘em, we had to bury ‘em.
We have about four to five hundred cattle now between 20 parts per billion and 3 parts per
million, and since… well, by state law, now, we have to… the state has to officially take these
cattle off, pay the farmers $800 apiece and do somethin’ with ‘em. The same legislature that
passed the law sayin’, “Hey, you gotta quarantine these things,” turned right around and says,
“But you can’t bury ‘em in my Congressional district.” Every damn one of ‘em… okay? And every
site that the state went to find… to get a permit for burial, the state legislature and the people
rose up, got a court injunction and said, “Not here.” Right across the state, mmkay? So of
course they had to do something with the cattle sitting there. So what do you do with ‘em?
They’re not gonna go away, okay? And so then what happened, they tried to get permission to
hold ‘em on a researched wildlife area so they could decide what to do with ‘em. The court
there—the local citizens got so concerned and so uptight, they got a court injunction
prohibiting from holding them on the surface. So here we got a state that says, “You gotta take
‘em, you can’t bury ‘em, you can’t keep ‘em on the surface.” Mmkay?
[audience member shouts something that causes a bit of laughter in the audience]
Well, one of the guys commented we can put it and shoot it into orbit, and we have the herd
shot around the world. [laughter and some groans] But, no, you… Stop and think about it! And
again, this… Michigan’s not a backwards state! These are a bunch of people in the state who
have learned through the public media and have been scared absolutely senseless. And the
state legislature is reflecting that same paranoid… it’s no longer a scientific debate at all. The
sum total—if you take those four to five hundred cattle—you know the sum total amount of
PBB in those cattle is less than an ounce—a teaspoon full? Do you know how much 20 parts per
billion is? Okay? There’s probably one molecule in this whole room. There you got one ounce,
and here we—if you had one good house fire—what they don’t realize is what was PBB made
for? Well, it’s a fire retardant; it’s in baby’s clothes, it’s in your plastic handle of your telephone,
it’s in your… a lot of it’s in insulation in the house. What they’re talkin’ about is that one little
accident that got here. What about the several million pounds of the stuff they’ve been making
for the last 10-15 years, okay? You get more of that released into the atmosphere with one
good house fire than you would from all 400 of those cattle. But it’s, you know… that’s no
longer the point, the point is it’s caught up in this tremendous social trauma of what do you do
with toxic materials, all right? And it's gotten to point where we finally got an order of court
injunction to go up here in Kalkaska and take a burial pit, and the judge ruled that they had to
line it with 20 feet of clay. The total cost is to two and a quarter million dollars to haul in by
truck and load 20 feet of clay all the way around six sides, and they did that. They got that done
three weeks ago. There were 600 people were out there demonstrating, hanging the

government in effigy, okay? They got a court injunction once they developed the pit, not to let
them use it, and it was going to the Supreme Court in Michigan. They went up last week to the
Supreme Court, they asked the local court to give ‘em advice; that came in two days ago, and
they said, “Well, since you built the pit, go ahead and bury ‘em for the next six months, then go
to incineration, okay? Of course there’s no incinerators built, and that’s gone… that went back
to the Supreme Court today, supposedly.
Now, here's a case where, you know, if you argue in terms of science, there isn’t any rational
way whatsoever that this kind of thing should be happening. If you look at it from the point of
view of the gap between the knowledge of the average public has walkin’ the street dealing
with organic toxic materials, and what the bureaucrat says he has to do to solve a problem, that
information gap is, to me, the single biggest source of problems. I’ve seen it with Kepone, I’ve
seen it with PBB, I’ve seen it with storage of nuclear waste, where the solutions to these
problems to protect the environment require technology to acquire kinds of mitigating
techniques that the average public has no knowledge about whatsoever. And it’s very, very
vulnerable, then, to this kind of mass hysteria game where, you know, I can show you cases
we’re now monitoring, I can show you compounds that are orders of magnitude more toxic
being dumped by industrial waste haulers down open sanitation drains, being dumped directly
in rivers at night in the state of Michigan right now. These are orders of magnitude worse than
PBB. This is somewhere between Kepone and aspirin in terms of the toxicology, okay?
I’ll show you the problems one has and… Michigan Chemical, of course, when this happened,
did the same thing that Life Sciences did: they immediately declared bankruptcy. Now, the
problem was, they were also discharging in the Pine River. The Pine River runs right through
that plant and goes in the Saginaw Bay of Lake Huron, and we wanted to, essentially, get them
to stop discharging as fast as possible, all right? The problem is, our Attorney General says,
“Yeah, but if you just take them to court, the average court, you know, the time for resolution
in court’s about 18 months, and they can legally keep dumping during the 18 months.” So the
state, then, in order to get them to stop right now [snaps fingers] had to give them a general
release, had to give the industry something that they wanted, to stop automatically, all right?
And they gave ‘em a general release so that the state would not pursue any legal liability claims
of all compounds, of all amounts in all waters both known and unknown ‘til 1978, okay? And
they shut down the plant.
Six weeks later, we found a sanitation landfill 20 miles away with 356,000 pounds of PBB buried
in it. That's still sitting there right now, and of course we can't—the state, I mean—we criticize
the hell out of ‘em for doin’ it, but they felt at the time they had to do it. They cannot pursue…
legally, okay, economic penalties now. Both Michigan Chemical and Michigan Farm Bureau paid

off insurance, the largest environmental insurance fees about 30 million bucks, of course that
was the extent of their coverage. Michigan Chemical has declared bankruptcy. The federal
court, just two weeks ago, gave them each a $1,000 fine in each of four accounts under a no
contest charge, which means it stopped all testimony in federal court, so there’s no way to
pursue that, okay?
The question is: what do you do with this kind of thing? I mean it’s very easy to say, “Well, we
just find the guy responsible for this thing and hang him.” [writing on the board] The guy that
actually made the mistake with the forklift, what's the point of hanging him? Okay? The basic
mistake was allowing two operations to exist in the same facility where this kinda thing goes
on. Now, as a result of this, in Michigan, we have analyzed a number of alternatives. We made
nine recommendations to the governor, he’s implemented all nine of ‘em. Very briefly, the kind
of things that we recommended, none of ‘em will stop the event—there’s no way you can go
out and anticipate where this is gonna happen and stop it. The best you can do is get ways of
responding rapidly and get the authority to go in and mandate.
We now have… legislation has passed that sets up a toxic commission in the state that has
police powers, so that as soon as one of these things break, it can subpoena all records, it can
put a halt on all production, all shipment, all sales of any compound in the state, unilaterally.
And this is a citizens’ commission with seven members appointed by the governor—no state
officials, okay? We have got appropriations in the state to build a dedicated incinerator that’s a
stable design, and probably get the private enterprise sector to run. I'm on the group to design
the damn thing… where we want a dedicated facility to do everything from burning cattle to
handle industrial waste of all kinds; everything from incineration to lead oxidation to deep well
disposal. It’s a dedicated site and it requires any industry in the state that’s dealing with a toxic
material either to prove that they have their own waste facilities themselves, or be forced by
regulation to operate within the state facility—one or the other. They’ve also got legislation to
set up a manifest system that if you have certain kinds of compounds that are toxic enough to
warrant this, that… the paperwork is tremendous. To actually have an manifest invoice system
where you track the total load of this stuff. Where if General Motors produces 400 tons of
compound X that’s toxic, they actually have a manifest system recording where it goes and
who's got it until you can actually show it’s disposed of. Okay? The same way we do with
radioactive waste.
But that is a very, very costly and difficult thing to implement, and you won't do that unless you
have a really bad—you know, a bad kind of toxicological problem, or potential problem. We’ve
also implemented a specimen bank program. Remember I mentioned the fact that the only way
Allied Chemical was held accountable was the fish that he had in the freezer? We’ve got the

money to the legislature and we’re working with EPA to set up a specimen bank in the Great
Lakes where we are storing organic samples at -80 degrees, where the organic integrity of the
sample is maintained. So what you do is you go in and you take a sample fish […] of the Great
Lakes, and you do that chemical fingerprint I showed ya, okay? And you store that in a
computer and you put the rest of the organic sample in liquid nitrogen or something that will
essentially maintain the organic nature, so it won't decompose in time. So it won’t stop the
problem from happening, but if we had that kind of databank and all of a sudden 10 years from
now we got a new crisis… the unknown, it hits, okay? What you can do is you can go back and
you can sample through your databank on the computer, and find out where that spike was
and where it showed up. And you know what samples are there, and you go out and take a
small amount of that sample, analyze for it, and very rapidly tell where the problem started,
how far it’s gone, what the levels were, and who’s been affected. It’s like we're doing that now
with blood in humans. It turns out that public health kept blood samples for human health
disease diagnostic reasons in a blood bank. And you can go back now—and we have—and
systematically monitored for PBB, and in the fall of ‘73, winter ‘74 PBB shows in the human
blood, just like that. Beautiful. And you can just track it from that point of discharge how it
diffuses through the state and how fast it’s going.
Now, the one other alternative that often times comes up is people say, “Well, why don’t you
just ban these things?” Often times we’ll say, “Look it, so much for these kinds of organic
compounds, I don't wanna live with ‘em. No matter what you say as a technocrat or bureaucrat,
I don't want the risk, okay, of having to deal with that kind of uncertainty. Take the damn things
off the market.” Those of you that heard John Billingham yesterday talking about the human
settlement. That he’s talking about that human settlement in the L5 orbit. I was involved last
summer with designing the interior ecological support system for that thing. For the first time—
what this is, it's an L5 orbit off the moon, they want to put a human settlement up there. The
sociologists tell ‘em that 10,000 people is the smallest social unit you could isolate and keep
happy so that work efficiency is up, so they’ve designed that thing for the minimum of 10,000
people, okay? And they want to put that thing up in space and keep it there and have ‘em work
like hell and be very, you know, it’s kinda like an old pioneering town or the old gold mining
town, where they want to have a very rustic existence but a very high work efficiency.
And the sociologists and humanists have gone through and analyzed case studies like, you
know, sailors in nuclear subs that are isolated for nine months at a time, or crews of people
down in the Antarctic where you put ‘em down there for a year at a time. They’ve also done
studies on the astronauts in the Apollo program, and what they’ve found, at least in their
interpretation, is in order to keep that kind of high work ethic, you gotta keep ‘em happy. And
the way you keep ‘em happy is to have a rich array of consumer goods: good food, bright

colors, all kinds of novelty, all kinds of trinkets, okay? And of course they’re assuming, then, the
head architect for this thing came from General Motors, and they’re assuming all kinds of
elaborate fibers and the neat kinds of things you’d take up. And so we walked them through
this whole Kepone, PBB, toxic materials… ‘course you get up there in the closed ecosystem and
you haven’t got room for a mistake, do ya?
‘Cause see, down here on Earth the oceans, the atmosphere, the soils are our big sink—they’re
a buffer—so you make a mistake and, to a great degree, the environment can assimilate it. It
doesn’t go away, it just kinda stores it, absorbs it, binds it up. Where it takes a really major
mistake before it hurts you. Kepone and PBB are not unique events that go on everyday. The
only thing unique about it is it happened with enough of it that the spike was so high, you
couldn’t afford to ignore it. Well, in something like a spaceship with no sinks, no buffers, the
system’s online and any little mistake comes along with the same amplitude of error, okay? So
the control system there is infinitely more complicated. If we walk them through these things,
and of course they say, “Well, there’s no way we can control those. So what we’ll do is we’ll just
outlaw ‘em; we’ll have a list that says any of these toxic compounds we will not allow on our
little closed ecosystem.” Which is an interesting kind of intellectual exercise to go through.
So what we did is we went down to Palo Alto last summer, we called the EPA office at San
Francisco and said, “Hey, give me your list of toxic materials,” and they have 129 of them on
their list. Well, that's not only because there’s 129, there’s 129 that we know how to monitor,
and I’ll tell you the first one. They keep adding them as they get better technology, but there’s
129 on there. So we took just the top 30, and went back to the architects, said, “Okay, now let's
go down through all your plastic toothbrushes and your, you know, television sets, and your
bright acrylic paints on your wall, and any one of these things that either has one of these 30
compounds or breaks down into one of these as some by-product, we’ll take off the list.” And
you can you imagine what happened. What you end up with is a titanium shield with silicon
windows, both made out of moon rock… [laughter] okay? And that's why, again, one of the
reasons that I made the statement that I think that the Toxic Materials and Substances Act is
one of the most pervasive pieces of environmental legislation; that if you really tried to enforce
that, the letter of that law, and you stop and think to the degree to which our society here has
become dependent upon synthetic chemistry for a very, very diversified, enjoyable lifestyle,
okay, and our primitive knowledge is to what… which of these are the bad actors and which are
not. It’s gonna have a tremendous impact in the near future. We’ll begin to see it in Michigan
right away. Just last week… the gypsy moth is a forest insect on the East Coast that’s raised an
awful lot of problems. Now it’s in Pennsylvania and deforesting large areas. We have small
resident populations in Michigan. Department of Agriculture wanted to spray with Dimilin, it’s
an insecticide, to try to eradicate the gypsy moth this year. They had claimed the thing was

absolutely safe, but they’re gonna spray about 140,000 acres of farmland—all the trees
including those around the farms. Some of ‘em are organic farms; organic farmers didn’t like it.
We got a report just last week that his thing breaks down into something that looks like it’s
potentially carcinogenic. The data’s lousy. The study is very marginal—the National Cancer
Institute agrees that it’s very preliminary data, but the law doesn’t allow that. The new law says
the data has to be absolutely ironclad it’s safe. If there’s any doubt at all, that thing can't be
sprayed. That is, that law has reversed the scientific process. Before you had to keep workin’,
okay? Until you could actually show it was dangerous. Now, all the data has to be is not
conclusively zero effect, which makes it a brand-new ball game, and that legislation lays out not
only mutagenicity, carcinogenicity, teratogenicity which is, you know, embryological
development—abnormal development—but also ecosystem, community, and population
effects ecologically. This spells out the total array of toxicological pathological things, both in
the human ecosystem, and the natural ecosystem.
Now, where they’re gonna go from that is, again, look at one of these examples where there’s a
major crisis: Kepone and PBB. The public reacts, the legislature says, “Well, we’ll solve that
problem. We’ll pass a law saying it won’t happen, okay? Appropriate 100 new positions for EPA
to carry out the law.” You could take all the biochemists, all the toxicologists in this country—
both private and public—and you couldn't carry out that law. So obviously what they’re gonna
have to do is to pick and choose. And someone’s gonna have to decide, “Well, these six
compounds we’ll start on first and we’ll get conclusive data, and then we’ll take the next six.”
There isn’t any way, or if they do get sucked into trying to take on all 30,000 at once, it’s gonna
be just total chaos. But it's one that you ought to look at. It’s one, that if you wanted to lay out
a interesting case study in terms of a generic set of problems, it won’t take you very much to
pick up the phone and look at your industries here in Oregon. I could tell you the ones in
Michigan ‘cause I’ve dealt with ‘em. I’ll guarantee you got the same types of problems here. A
different set of companies, a different set of compounds, but the same technology. It’d be very
easy, I'm sure, to get ahold of your local public health and DNR and so forth, and get good
example you can use as case studies—not that anybody has the right answer, here’s a case
where with environmental decision-making that nobody can just tell ya, “I know how to do it,”
except do nothing, which you're not gonna do. And it’s an interesting one in the sense that
there’re no, you know, concrete right and wrong answers—it’s easy to tell the ones that are
bad, but pick one that’s new and try to decide whether or not it’s one you should outlaw or not,
that’s where it’s really tricky. Okay? I think my time's up. We’ll continue our discussion later.
[comment in the background]
COOPER: Which one?

[inaudible response; voices in backgroupd]
COOPER: This gentleman has a question here.
[inaudible question]
COOPER [at a slight distance from microphone; some phrases are unintelligible]: Well, yeah,
we… I met with a group here 11 o’clock this morning for questions and this came up.
Interestingly put, it has not been released yet, it’s [been] done by the Bureau of Commercial
Fisheries, where the result of this is monitoring toxic materials in fish on both Pacific and
Atlantic Coast within a forty-mile limit. And… tuna fish, swordfish, cape, flounder, red snapper,
and lobster, those fish are all above the FDA action level of 5/10ths a part per million of
mercury. If you heard about the tuna fish, that was the one with the smallest industry to make
a case out of it. It now has got data that… the interesting thing is, as far as they could tell, these
are natural levels, they’re not pollution. These are natural food chain accumulations of a toxic
material, at least by law, and that is the base level. Now, the way they’re trying to establish that
is, of course, going back into museum collections—but you have to be careful, of course, those
preservers didn’t have mercury in ‘em, so you do this for different preservers, different lengths
of time, different styles of potential contamination. And of course, with mercury it’s inorganic
and won’t decompose, so you can tell that. Or […] glass, you have to be careful about that.
The other thing is [if] you look at it regionally, the same levels over hundreds of miles. That is,
the areas that have high industrial affluent and those who don’t have the same levels of
mercury. So you put those two pieces of information together, and it looks as if these are
natural, endemic levels of mercury, okay? And then the policy question, the new one, is like,
“Okay, well, what do you think of that?” And the average person I’ve dealt with [says], “Well,
obviously the level is just at the wrong level,”... because somehow if that it was a man-made
pollutant, it’s fair to regulate it. If it’s a natural level, then the people oughta have the risk to
expose themselves as they want. You wanna eat poisonous mushrooms, it’s your choice, but
you shouldn’t regulate it. It’s an interesting debate. If you really enforce the FDA levels like it is
right now, you would not let any of those fish […]. Now, if we were to dodge it right now, and
not make it a public issue out of it, then one of the big lobbyists against that is Weight
Watchers. They lobby like heck, and you know why, they eat fish, […] diet, low-fat and […]. And
of course, you can immediately say, “Well, wait, well, what makes you so sure that your 5 parts
per million is that accurate? […] 100,000 as a fudge factor?” It’s in there. But now you ask
yourself the question, “Well, if you can rationalize moving it up to 1 part per million, is it safe?”
Part moves down to 1/10th of a part per million, what makes you sure your erring […] way? It
gets pretty wild! But by law, FDA has to set those; some bureaucrat has to put a number on

that. The law… then the law will say, “We don’t know enough, we’ll wait.” So that’s an
interesting one to watch. I’m not sure what they’re gonna do with it. They have not made that
information very public yet.
[inaudible comment]
COOPER: You won’t live long enough.
[laughter; voices in background; program ends]

